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Abstract
The combinatorics of classical propositional logic lies at the heart of both local and global
methods of proof-search enabling the achievement of least-commitment search. Extension of such
methods to the predicate calculus, or to non-classical systems, presents us with the problem of
recovering this least-commitment principle in the context of non-invertible rules. One successful
approach is to view the non-classical logic as a perturbation on search in classical logic and
characterize when a least-commitment (classical) search yields sucient evidence for provability
in the (non-classical) logic. This technique has been successfully applied to both local and
global methods at the cost of subsidiary searches and is the analogue of the standard treatment
of quantiers via skolemization and unication. In this paper, we take a type-theoretic view of
this approach for the case in which the non-classical logic is intuitionistic. We develop a system
of realizers (proof-objects) for sequents in classical propositional logic (the types) by extending
Parigot’s -calculus, a system of realizers for classical free deduction (cf. natural deduction).
Our treatment of disjunction exploits directly the multiple-conclusioned form of LK as opposed
to the single-conclusioned form of LJ. Consequently, it requires the addition of another binding
operator, called , to . This choice is motivated by our concern to reect the properties of
classical proof-search in the system of realizers. Using this framework, we illustrate the sense in
which intuitionistic search can be viewed as a perturbation on classical search. As an application,
we develop a proof procedure based on the natural extension of the notion of uniform proof to
the multiple-conclusioned classical sequent calculus Harrop fragment of intuitionistic logic. This
paper develops the proof-theoretic aspects of the approach. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All
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1. Introduction
1.1. Classical propositional logic and proof-search
The peculiar combinatorial properties of classical propositional logic (CPL) are of
general signicance for automated deduction far beyond interest in simple (classical)
propositional theorems might suggest. Both local methods (e.g., the inverse method
or resolution) and global methods (e.g., Gentzen systems and tableaux) achieve an
ideal form when applied to CPL. For the former, the Conjunctive Normal Form The-
orem supports a considerable degree of localization, with search spaces made up of
sets of derived units (clauses) each of which may be considered independently of
the others. For the latter, the search spaces generated by extension of derivation trees
can be signicantly reduced using congruences arising from rule permutations to pro-
duce improved tableaux methods or methods based on path-checking algorithms (e.g.,
connection methods). These applications reect two sides of the same coin, the dual-
ity being expressed most elegantly by Gentzen’s Hauptsatz for LK [6] which yields
refutational completeness for the cut rule with sequent theories as axioms, and direct
completeness for the cut-free fragment of LK.
1.2. Quantiers and non-classical logics
The addition of quantiers to CPL to form the predicate calculus (CPC) brings
problems with non-invertible rules (eigenvariable conditions) and the consequent limita-
tion on the permutation congruence. Herbrand’s Theorem [10], Gentzen’s Mid-Sequent
Theorem [6], Smullyan’s Fundamental Theorem [31] and the Prenex Normal Form
Theorem, can be used to limit the impact of the non-invertible rules and to retain
the structure of the propositional search space. The cost is the superposition of the
unication search space and Skolemization, or their equivalents, on the underlying
propositional space.
For certain regular non-classical logics, such as normal modal logics and intuitionistic
logic, non-invertible rules are already present in propositional systems. Nevertheless,
a view can be developed of these logics in which search involving the non-classical
connectives is seen essentially as a perturbation on classical search, by analogy with
the predicate calculus. This view has been expressed as a \matrix characterization" by
Wallen [34], rendered in local form by Ohlbach [17] and in global form by authors
such as Otten and Kreitz [18]. Metatheorems of this kind have been developed for a
predicative type theory by Pym and Wallen [23, 26].
1.3. Classical logic as the basic search calculus
These observations and results have led us to the view that CPL plays a pivotal role
in search calculi. Or, to put it more programmatically, that CPL expresses the logic
of least-commitment search: the ideal for any complex search problem. Reduction to
this ideal, perhaps with the superposition of subsidiary search spaces to account for
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the irregularities of non-classical and non-propositional connectives, might usefully be
considered as the goal of (theoretical eorts in) automated deduction when faced with
a new formalism.
For modal, and to some extent intuitionistic, systems this reduction can be seen as
being semantically motivated (e.g., [17]), in much the same way that it is easier to think
in terms of \Godel{Skolem" than \Herbrand" when motivating the syntactic transfor-
mations involved in Skolemization and unication. Such a view has pragmatic, and
certainly pedagogical force, but threatens to leave important factors out of the analysis
relating to the ne-structure of search spaces; for example, questions of decidability
and optimality are but two that come to mind concerning the role of contraction.
1.4. Classical logic as a type-theoretic formalism
In order to seek a perspective from which to understand how search in a logic may
be viewed proof-theoretically as a perturbation on search in classical propositional
logic, we develop below a treatment of classical logic as a type theory, in which the
types are LK derivations. Objects, dened in a suitable system, inhabit, or realize, the
LK derivations and serve to capture the basic congruences at work in the search space
(typically, permutation of rules and reduction of implicit cuts).
The basic language of realizers is provided by (simple extensions of) Parigot’s -
calculus [19{21]. However, the treatment of disjunction in this setting is a delicate
matter. We distinguish two formulations, + and _. The former is derived from the
single-conclusioned form of the intuitionistic calculus LJ,
+I
  `i; 
  `1 + 2;  (i=1; 2)
Realizers for this disjunction are given by the usual terms for sums in the -calculus.
The latter exploits the multiple-conclusioned form of LK,
_I   `1; 2; 
  `1 _ 2;  :
In this form, the principal formula of the conclusion is composed of two formulae from
the succedent of the premiss. In the sequel, we show that a system of realizers for _
requires the addition of a second binding operator, , to perform this composition. We
call the extended calculus .
From the point of view of logical consequence, the two formulations are equivalent,
being interderivable via weakening. However, from the computational perspective of
proof-search, they are very dierent. The use of +I forces a non-deterministic choice
between 1 and 2 when using the former as a reduction operator, while the latter
forces no such choice.
The realizers play two roles in the sequel: initially, to permit axiomatization of the
perturbation which yields the non-classical search space; subsequently, to allow such
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perturbations to be related. Proof-theoretically, using classical predicate calculus as a
guide for terminology, we seek generalized Herbrand results. Semantically, we seek
an explanation of the force of the myriad of syntactic tricks developed to embed non-
classical logics in the classical propositional system.
1.5. Overview of the paper
In this paper, we develop the basic type-theoretic results for  and show how
to axiomatize the perturbation which results in intuitionistic logic. We also present an
application.
In Section 2, we review the idea of proof-objects=realizers, and develop a suitable
set of realizers for classical logic by extending the -calculus of Parigot [19]. This
involves extending  successively by conjunctive types, then disjunctive types, and
nally by explicit substitution. While the addition of conjunctive types is straightfor-
ward, the disjunctive case is more delicate. We explain how our intention to model
search and not just proof motivates our choice of the LK-like version _ in prefer-
ence to the LJ-like version + and why this choice requires  to be used as the
language of realizers. The addition of explicit substitution to form  is required for
a proper search-based treatment of implication. For each of these calculi, we establish
the requisite proof-theoretic properties of strong normalization and conuence.
Section 3 is devoted to the axiomatization of search in intuitionistic logic as a
perturbation on the base classical system. This takes the form of a condition on a
classical realizer which indicates (the existence of) an intuitionistic derivation of the
classically derived endsequent. This condition is the equivalent of the admissibility
condition on prex uniers in [34], but formulated in a more direct form.
In Section 4, we consider an application of the results to (hereditary Harrop) ana-
lytic resolution. Type-theoretically, this involves considering -expanded forms of the
realizers.
A semantic (category-theoretic) view of  has been developed to support further
analysis. This will be presented by Pym and Ritter elsewhere. An application of the
results to intuitionistic and classical resolution has been developed in [29]. A prelimi-
nary version of the work presented herein for the fragment of intuitionistic propositional
logic without negation or disjunction can be found in [28].
2. Proof-objects and -calculus
2.1. Proof-objects and realizers
For propositional intuitionistic (;:;^;+)-logic, proofs of a sequent  !A, within
a single-conclusioned calculus of sequents LJ, can be interpreted as constructions of
natural deductions of the succedent formula A from the antecedent formulae in  
[35, 22, 1]. Such a natural deduction  can be seen as a proof-object realizing (i.e.,
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providing evidence for) the consequence   ` A.  describes how to obtain natural
deduction proofs of A from natural deduction proofs of the formulae in  .
In propositional intuitionistic (;:;^;+)-logic, the relationship between the proof-
object  and the formulae in  !A is particularly intimate. Specically, if  =A1; : : : ;
Am and if each Ai is labelled with an assumption marker, xi, then  corresponds to a
-term of type A, built out of variables x1; : : : ; xm.
This correspondence, between natural deduction proofs and -terms on the one
hand and propositions and types on the other, does not hold for classical natural de-
duction. However, Parigot’s -calculus [19] provides an elegant language of proof-
objects based on an algorithmic interpretation of classical sequent calculus provided
by cut-elimination. The proof-objects are realizers for multiple-conclusioned sequents
 !A; , where A is a distinguished, or active, formula. -terms provide combinato-
rial evidence for the existence of classical sequent derivations.
2.2. The -calculus
We begin by introducing a minor variation on Parigot’s -calculus [19]. In addition
to implicational types, we include conjunctive types. We proceed to add disjunctive
types and then explicit substitutions uft=xg. The latter are used in the analysis of search
below to give suitable representatives for possibly incompletable sequent derivations.
Parigot presents in [19] only a -calculus with implicational types and -reductions.
The addition of conjunctive types is straightforward, but the addition of disjunctive
types is more problematic as there are two main alternatives which we will briey
discuss below. To model the transition from a given proof to a uniform proof we
also need -expansions. We show that strong normalization and conuence still hold
for this extended calculus but the reducibility proof needs careful reworking as the
-expansions give rise to additional reduction rules.
We present this calculus in four steps: rstly, we introduce the -calculus with
implicational types, conjunctive types and -reductions. Secondly, we add disjunctive
types and, thirdly, we add -expansion and prove strong normalization and conuence
for this system. Finally, we add explicit substitutions, showing that normalization and
conuence are preserved.
2.2.1. Implication and conjunction
The raw terms of the -calculus with conjunction are given by the following gram-
mar:
t ::= x j x:A:t j tt j : t j []t j ?: t j [?]t j ht; ti j (t) j 0(t):
We assume that the scope of the bracket operator []t extends as far to the right as
possible, i.e., the term []ts is implicitly bracketed as [](ts). The rules for well-formed
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terms are as follows:
 ; x:A` x:A;  Ax
 ; x:A` t:B; 
  ` x:A:t:AB;  I
  ` t:AB;    ` s:A; 
  ` ts:B;  E
  ` t:A; 
  ` : t:A;  
  ` t:A; 
  ` []t:A;  [ ]
  ` t:
  ` : t:A;  
  ` t:A; A; 
  ` []t:A;  [ ]
  ` t:
  ` ?: t:?;  ?I
  ` t:?; 
  ` [?]t: ?E
  ` t:A;    ` s:B; 
  ` ht; si:A ^ B;  ^ I
  ` t:A ^ B; 
  ` (t):A;  ^ E
  ` t:A ^ B; 
  ` 0(t):B;  ^ E
The second instances of the rules [ ] and  model contraction and weakening respec-
tively.
The denition of the reduction rules requires not only the standard substitution t[s=x],
but also a substitution for names t[s=[]u], which intuitively indicates the term t with
all occurrences of a subterm of the form []u replaced by s. To dene this notion, we
need the notion of a term with holes. Such a term C with holes of type A is a -term
which may have also the additional term constructor with the rule   ` :A; . The
term C(u) denotes the term C with the holes textually (with possible variable capture)
replaced by u. Then we dene t[C(u)=[]u], where  is a name and u is a metavariable,
by
x[C(u)=[]u] = x
([]t)[C(u)=[]u] = C(t[C(u)=[]u])
and dened on all other expressions by pushing the replacement inside.
There are three kinds of reduction rules:  and -rules, which are familiar from
the -calculus, and -rules. The -rules model commuting conversions: they shift the
logical left-rules upwards in the proof tree. The reduction rules are the following ones:
 (x:A:t)s  t[s=x]
 (A B: t)s  B: t[[]us=[]u]
(A?: t)s  ?: t[[?]us=[]u]
  :[]s  s if  not free in s
 [](:s)  s[=]
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 ; A!A;  Ax
 ; A; B!
 ; A ^ B! ^L
 1!A; 1  2!B; 2
 1;  2!A ^ B; 1; 2 ^R
 1A!1  2; B!2
 1;  2; A _ B!1; 2 _L
 !A; B; 
 !A _ B;  _R
 1!A; 1  2; B!2
 1;  2; AB!1; 2 L
 ; A; !B
 !AB;  R
 !A; 
 ;:A! :L
 ; A!
 !:A;  :R
Fig. 1. Cut-free multiple-conclusioned sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic.
? ?:[?]t  t
? [?]?: t  t
^ (A^B:s)  A:s[[](u)=[]u]
0(A^B:s)  B:s[[]0(u)=[]u]
(?^B:s)  ?: s[[?](u)=[]u]
0(A^?: s)  ?: s[[?]0(u)=[]u]
^ (ht; si)  t
0(ht; si)  s
The -calculus provides an account of classical free deduction, which is natural
deduction extended to multi-conclusioned sequents (Fig. 1): i.e., the terms are realizers
for a calculus in which multiple-conclusioned sequents can be derived without impure
constraints [2]. Consequently, the form of the typing judgment in the -calculus is
  ` t :A; , where   is a context familiar from the typed -calculus and  is a context
containing types indexed by names, ; ; : : : ; which are distinct from variables. The idea
is that each -sequent has exactly one principal formula, A, on the right-hand side,
the leftmost one, which is the formula upon which all introduction and elimination
rules operate. This formula is the type of the term t.
The term []t realizes the introduction of a name. The term :[]t realizes the
exchange operation: if A was part of  before the exchange, then A is the principal
formula of the succedent after the exchange. Taken together, these terms also provide
a notation for the realizers of contractions and weakenings on the right of a multiple-
conclusioned calculus. It is also easy to detect whether a formula B in the right-hand
side is, in fact, superuous, i.e., that there is a derivation of   ` t:A; 0 in which 0
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does not contain B; it is superuous if  is not a free name in t. This observation is
exploited in the sequel.
The -calculus has a special formula ? and treats the formula :A as A?. The
?I -and ?E-rule model the fact that the formula ? can be freely added to the right-
hand side of each derivation. As these two rules suggest, we treat ? as a special name,
and when we have a generic term : t with   ` t:B; A; , we always include the case
?: t.
Remark. Note that in the version of the -calculus presented above the term []t has
no principal type. The intuition behind this is that this term occurs only as a subterm in
a term like :[]t, which models structural rules on the right-hand side. It is possible
to give a dierent, semantically motivated, presentation of the -calculus in which
all terms have a principal type. This is done by choosing the principal type ? for the
term []t. Hence the rules for : t and []t are changed to
  ` t:A; 
  ` []t:?; A;  and
  ` t:?; A; 
  ` : t:A;  :
It follows that there is no need in such a system for the terms ?: t and [?]t or
their corresponding rules, ?I and ?E, because these terms were introduced solely as
realizers for ?I and ?E. Because, in our system, we have ?:[?]t= t and [?]?: t= t,
the two systems are equivalent in the sense that there exist translations between them
which preserve equality and which are inverse up to equality. Similar rules express
weakening and contraction in this way. We use the version outlined above because the
algorithms for proof-search rely on the fact that the application of structural rules on
the right-hand side is indicated by a term :[]t, where  or  might be ?.
2.2.2. Disjunctive types: the -calculus
The key point in the addition of disjunctive types is naturally explained in the setting
of the multiple-conclusioned sequent calculus.
One possible formulation, with a single minor formula in the premiss, follows the
form of the right rule for disjunction in LJ,
 !Ai; 
 !A1 + A2;  ; i=1; 2; (1)
yielding the usual addition of sums (coproducts) to the realizing -terms:
t ::= inl(t) j inr(t) j case t of inl(x)) t + inr(y)) t:
An alternative formulation [2] exploits the presence of multiple conclusions, as in
LK:
 !A1; A2; 
 !A1 _ A2;  : (2)
This formulation is the more desirable as a basis for proof-search because it main-
tains a local representation of the global choice between A1 and A2. Given a local
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representation, we can hope to avoid backtracking to this point in the search space. In
particular, this form of disjunction can be exploited to improve the eciency of certain
formulations of logic programming.
For the -calculus, however, this latter formulation presents a new diculty. Sup-
pose the -sequent   ` t: A; B;  is to be the premiss of an application of the _I
rule. In forming the disjunctive active formula A_ B, we move the named formula B
from the context to the active position. Consequently, _I is formulated as a binding
operation on names and we add the following constructs to , to form the grammar
of -terms:
t ::= hit j  : t: (3)
The term  : t introduces a disjunction and the term hit eliminates one. The associated
inference rules are as follows:
  ` t: A; B; 
  ` : t: A _ B;  _ I
  ` t: A _ B; 
  ` hit: A; B ;  _E
  ` t: A; 
  ` ? : t: A _ ?;  _I?
  ` t: A _ ?; 
  ` h?it: A;  _E?:
To avoid variable capture, we have to add a special clause for the mixed substitution:
(hit)[[C(u)=[]u]] = :C(:[]hit[C(u)=[]u])
where  is a fresh name. If we had pushed the substitution through, the substitution
lemma fails: the term :[]hix is well-formed if x is of type A_ (BC). If the term
(:[]hix)[[0]us=[]u is dened as :[0](hixs), we obtain an ill-formed term.
The corresponding reduction rules are
_ hi( :s)  s[=]
_ hi: t  : t[[]his=[]s]
_? hi?_B : t  ? : t[[?]his=[]s]
_? h?iA_? : t  : t[[]h?is=[]s]:
The rules _I?, _E?; _? and _? are special cases of _I , _E, _ and _, respectively.
They are included as convenient abbreviations and need not be analysed separately.
Remark. To avoid loops during reduction, all -rules do not apply if the term t in
which the name  is changed is equal to hit0, and  does not occur in t0.
Although the LK-like _ can derived from the LJ-like + (and vice versa) via weak-
ening, they are not \isomorphic". I.e., there does not exist a bijection between
ft j  ` t: A1 + A2;  is provableg
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and
ft j  ` t: A1 _ A2;  is provableg;
which respects the congruence induced on terms induced by normalization. Indeed, the
imposition of a bijection forces for every  ; , t and A, the set
ft j  ` t: A;  is provableg
to have at most one element. The proper formulation of this result requires semantic
techniques which make essential use of bred structure. This will be presented by Pym
and Ritter elsewhere.
2.2.3. -rules, strong normalization and conuence
Parigot gives only reduction rules for -reduction. To model uniform proofs, we also
need extensionality, i.e., we must have the -rules. We will work with long -normal
forms in the sequel. We introduce them here as expansions; that is, each term of
functional type is transformed into a -abstraction, each term of product type into a
product and each term of sum type into a term : t0. These rules are
 t  x: A:t x
^ t  h(t); 0(t)i
_ t   :hit
In these rules, we assume that t is neither a -abstraction, nor a product, nor a term
 : t0, nor that t occur as the rst argument of an application, or as the argument of a
projection  or 0 or of some term hi . In the  -, ^- and _-rules, we also assume
that t is of function type, product type and sum type respectively.
These -rules generate critical pairs which give rise to additional reduction rules.
As an example, consider the term t= []:s, where  is a name of type AB. This
term can reduce via an -expansion to []x: A:(: t)x, and via a -rule to t. The
reduction from []x: A:(: t)x to t can be seen as a generalized renaming operation.
This operation is denoted by tfg and is dened as follows:
Denition 1. Dene the generalized renaming of a -term t by a name , written
tfg, by induction over the type of the name  as follows:
Atomic type: (: t)fg= t[=];
 AB: (x: A:t)fg= tf0g[[]x: A:u=[0]u] for some fresh name 0 if x occurs in
tf0g only within the scope of [0]u, otherwise (x: A:t)fg is undened;
 A ^ B: If t= ht1; t2i and for some names 1 and 2 of type A and B respectively,
t2f2g arises from t1f1g by replacing each subterm [1]s1 recursively by
some subterm [2]s2, then tfg= t1f1g[[]hs1; s2i=[1]s1];
 A _ B: ( : t)fg= tf0g[] :u=[0]u] for some fresh name 0 if  occurs in tf0g
only within the scope of [0]u, otherwise ( : t)fg is undened.
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The additional reduction rule, which is called , can now be stated as
 []t  tfg (4)
Note that this reduction rule specializes to the rule  if  is a name of atomic
type. Because the outermost bindings : of names of atomic type disappear by an
application of the -rule, this rule cannot give rise to reduction sequences t  t.
Logically, the -rule amounts to taking a right-rule and moving it above a structural
rule (i.e., weakening, contraction) applied to its principal formula.
Our rst lemma gives the local conuence of , extending Parigot’s result for 
[20].
Lemma 2. The notion of reduction in the -calculus is locally conuent.
Proof. We show that all critical pairs can be completed. For critical pairs arising from
the rules ,  and  this is part of the conuence of Parigot’s -calculus.
We show only a few characteristic cases for the rule  (4). The rst case is an
overlap with the -rule. The term
u=(:    [](x: A:   0:    [0]t   )   )s
can reduce via  to
0:    [0](x: A:   0:    [0]t   )s   
which in turn reduces via  and  to 0:    [0]t[s=x]    : The other reduction se-
quence via the additional rule is
u

 (:    []x: A:t   )s

 0:    [0](x: A:t)s   

 :    :[0]t[s=x]    :
The second case we consider is the overlap of the -rule with the -expansion. This
is the case which gives rise to the additional reduction rule . For this, consider the
term w= []: t, which can be reduced via the -rule to t. The reduction sequence
via the rule  is as follows:
w
⊃
 [](x: A:(: t)x)

 []x: A:0: t[[0]ux=[]u]

 t[[]x: A:ux=[]u];
which is t modulo some -expansions and=or -reductions.
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The choice of a distinguished formula on the right-hand side of the sequent is
required to ensure strong normalization and conuence. We use Parigot’s proof [21]
and extend it to the conjunctive and disjunctive types and explicit substitution.
We now give the proof of strong normalization for . We extend the result to in-
clude explicit substitutions in Section 2.2.4. This two-step argument is possible because
we do not have composition of substitutions.
Denition 3. Assume   ` t: A; . By induction over the structure of types in A and 
we dene sets of reducible -terms of type A; , written Red(A; ), and for each term
  ` t: A;  closure terms of type A; , written clA;(t) or cl(t) for short, as follows:
 If A and  are all atomic types or ?, then
Red(A; )= ft j  ` t: A;  and t is SNg
and clA;(t)= ;.
 If one of the types in A or  is not a atomic type or ?, dene Red(A; ) to be the
set of all terms   ` t: A;  such that all terms in cl(t) are reducible.
 The set of closure terms clA;(t) is dened as the union of the sets
fts j s2Red(B; )g if A=BC
f(t); 0(t)g if A=B ^ C
f:[]hit; hitg if A=B _ C
f(:[]t)s j s2Red(B; )g if BC 2
f(:[]t)); 0(:[]t)g if B^C 2
f:[]hi:[]t; hi:[]tg if B_C 2:
Next we dene the closure properties of the set of reducible terms. We dene clnA;(t)
to be the set of all terms tn such that there exists a sequence t0; t1; : : : ; tn with ti 2 cl(ti−1)
and t= t0, for all 16i6n.
Lemma 4. Every set of reducible -terms has the following properties:
S1 If t is reducible; then t is strongly normalizing;
S2 For all variables x; each element in cln(x) is reducible;
S3  If t[s=x] is reducible; so is each element of cln(x: A:t);
 If t and s are reducible; so is each element of cln(ht; si);
 If t[=] is reducible; so is each element of cln( : t);
S4 If t is reducible; so is cln(: []t).
Proof. We split each of conditions S2, S3 and S4 into two conditions, which we prove
by induction, and which together imply the original conditions. We use simultaneous
induction over the types of A and  to show the following properties:
S1 If t with   ` t: A;  for some   is reducible, then t is strongly normalizing;
S20 If for any element t of cln(x) with   ` t: A;  for some   all elements of clm(t)
are SN for any m>0, then t is reducible;
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S200 If   ` x: A;  for some  , then all elements of clm(x) are SN for any m>0;
S30  If all elements of clm(x: A:t) are SN for all m>0, then each element of
cln(x: A:t) is reducible if   ` cln(x: B:t): A;  for some  ;
 If all elements of clm(t) and clm(s) are SN for all m>0, then each element
of cln(ht; si) is reducible if   ` cln(ht; si): A;  for some  ;
 If all elements of clm( : t) are SN, then each element of cln( : t) is reducible
if   ` cln( : t): A;  for some  ;
S300  If   ` x: B:t: A;  for some   and t[s=x] is reducible for all reducible   ` s:
B; , then each element of clm(x: B:t) is SN;
 If   ` ht; si: A;  for some   and t and s are reducible, then each element of
clm(ht; si) is SN;
 If   `  : t: A;  for some   and t[=] is reducible for each name , then
each element of clm( : t) is SN;
S40 If t is reducible and clm(: []t) is SN for all m>0, then cln(: []t) is reducible
if   ` cln(:[]t): A;  for some  ;
S400 If   ` t: A;  for some   and t is reducible, then clm(: []t) is SN for all m>0;
The induction proceeds now as follows:
S1 If A and  are all atomic or ?, then t is SN by denition. If not, one does a case
analysis of A and . We consider here only the cases of A=B_C and A=BC.
In the rst case, if t   t0, then either hit   hit0, or t0=  :hit00, and t  t00
via all reduction rules except top-level -expansions. Hence any innite reduction
sequence starting with t can be extended to an innite reduction sequence of hit.
This is a contradiction because by induction hypothesis, hit is SN. ow assume
A=BC. Choose a variable x of type B which does not occur freely in t. By
S200 and S20, x is reducible. Hence by denition, t x is reducible, and SN by
S1 by induction hypothesis. Hence all reduction sequences of t which do not
involve outermost -expansions terminate. The case of an outermost -expansion
is treated in the same way as in the case of A=B _ C;
S20 If A and  are all atomic or ?, the claim is trivial. If not, we have to show that
all elements of cln+1(x) are reducible. This follows directly from the induction
hypothesis;
S200 Here we do an induction over m and use the fact that by induction hypothesis
for all reducible terms s which occur in clm(x); cl(k(s)) is SN for all k. In
particular, the restriction of the -rules mentioned in the Remark in Section 2.2.2
prevents an innite loop in the term (:[]hix)s;
S30 Same argument as for S20;
S300 Here we again use induction over m. We consider only one case; all other cases
are similar. Consider a reduction sequence
(: [](x: B:t)s)u  0[](x: B:t[[0]wu=[]w])s[[0]wu=[]w]
 0:[]t[[0]wu=[]w][s[[0]wu=[]w]=x]
= 0:[]t[s=x][[0]wu=[]w]
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for an element of cl2(x: A:t). By induction hypothesis (S1) (:[]s)u, (:[]
(x:A:t)x)u and 0:[]t[s=x][[0]wu=[]w] are SN. Hence (:[](x: B:t)s)u is
SN;
S40 Same argument as for [S20];
S400 One shows that any innite reduction sequence for s2 clm(:[]t) yields an
innite reduction sequence for an element of clm(t), which is SN by the induction
hypothesis (S1).
The key theorem states that every term is reducible. For this we need a generalized
induction hypothesis which includes all possible substitutions of reducible terms for
free variables and all mixed substitutions for free names. Mixed substitutions arise
as contracta of the -rules in the same way as the ordinary substitution arises as a
contractum of the -rule.
Theorem 5. For each -term t such that   ` t: A;  and reducible terms si and ui;
all terms
t[si=xi; [0j]wuj=[j]w; [
0
k ](u)=[k ]u;
[0m]
0(u)=[m]u; [0n]hniu=[n]u; r=r];
are reducible; where the names j; k ; m and n range over all subsets of names
in  of implication type; conjunction type; conjunction type and disjunction type
respectively and each of the m is dierent from each of the k . The names r form
some subset of the names in .
Proof. We write f for the substitution
[si=xi; [0j]wuj=[j]w; [
0
k ](u)=[k ]u;
[0m]
0(u)=[m]u; 0n]hniu=[n]u; r=r]
and write t[f] for the application of the substitution f to t. The proof proceeds by
induction over the derivation of t.
xi: Obvious, as xi[f] = si, which is reducible by assumption.
x: A:t: By induction hypothesis t[f; s=x] is reducible for every reducible term s, hence
(x :A:t)[f] is reducible by S3.
ts: By induction hypothesis, t[f] and s[f] are reducible, hence by denition of re-
ducibility t[f]s[f] = (ts)[f] is reducible.
A: t: By induction hypothesis, t[f] is reducible. Hence by S4, : t[f] is reducible
as well.
[A]t: If  occurs in f only as part of a substitution [=] or not at all, then ([]t)[f] =
[](t[f]) or [](t[f]), depending whether  occurs in f or not. By induction hy-
pothesis all elements of cl(t[f]) are reducible. Because cl([](t[f])) cl(t[f])
and cl([](t[f])) cl(t[f]) respectively, []t[f] is reducible. So now assume
that  does occur in f in a dierent position. In this case :(([]t)[f]) is an
element of cl(t[f]), hence it is reducible by induction hypothesis.
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ht; si: By induction hypothesis, t[f] and s[f] are reducible, hence by S3, ht[f]; s[f]i
is reducible.
(t), 0(t): By induction hypothesis, t[f] is reducible, hence (t[f]) and 0(t[f]) are
reducible by denition.
 : t: By induction hypothesis, t[f; =] is reducible. Hence property S3 now implies
the claim.
hit: By induction hypothesis, t[f] is reducible, and hence by denition hit[f] is
reducible, too.
Finally, we obtain the desired result as a corollary.
Corollary 6. All well-typed -terms are SN.
Now we are in a position to deduce conuence from local conuence and termination
via Newman’s Lemma [13].
Theorem 7. The -calculus is conuent.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Newman’s Lemma [13], which
states that a locally conuent and terminating notion of reduction is conuent.
2.2.4. Explicit substitution: the -calculus
Our nal extension of the -calculus involves adding a form of explicit substitution.
The presentation of the -calculus in [19] and of  herein is as a system of
linearized natural deduction with multiple conclusions, with implicational types both
introduced and eliminated on the right-hand side. An alternative formulation of Parigot’s
system, not aecting the structure of the derivable terms, would be as a sequent calcu-
lus, with the elimination of implicational types on the right replaced by the introduction
of implicational types on the left, as follows:
L  ; w:B` t:C;    ` s:A; 
 ; x:AB` t[xs=w]:C;  :
Such a rule is admissible in Parigot’s system since the cut rule,
Cut
  ` s:A;   ; w:A` t:B; 
  ` t[s=w]:B;  ;
is also admissible. In these rules, the substitution [t=x] is the usual implicit, meta-
theoretic one. An analysis such as this for a system of rst-order dependent function
types is presented in [24] and exploited as a basis for a theory of proof-search in [26].
The rule (L),
 ; w:B` t:C;    ` s:A; 
 ; x:AB` tfxs=wg:C;  L (5)
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which introduces the explicit substitution ufxs=wg, corresponds exactly to the usual
left rule for implication, but with explicit substitution replacing implicit substitution.
The -calculus contains this left rule for explicit substitution together with the usual
introduction and elimination rules for the implication. Similarly, we use explicit substi-
tutions for the _L-rule. We call a term u a substitution term if it occurs as a subterm
of u0 in the term sfu0=xg.
-terms are thus -terms enriched by the presence of explicit substitutions.
More precisely, the grammar of -terms is the grammar for the -calculus with
the added clause
t ::= tft=xg: (6)
If the substitution were implicit, and so evaluated when introduced, some parts of a
derivation would not be represented by the corresponding term. This happens if the
variable being replaced does not occur in the term. The rule for explicit substitution
L can thus be used to model the L-rule of the classical sequent calculus directly.
In [27], a similar analysis is provided for a proof system for SLD-resolution over
propositional implicational Horn clauses. Herbelin [9] also uses explicit substitutions,
for a similar reason, in his version of a translation of intuitionistic sequent calculus
(LJ) into a modied -calculus. His concern, however, is to restrict LJ so as obtain a
bijective correspondence between -terms and LJ-derivations.
Now we extend strong normalization and conuence to the -calculus. The re-
duction rules corresponding to L are as follows, where we assume standard variable
capture rules [1]:
(x:A:t)fs=zg  x:A:tfs=zg
(ts)fu=zg  tfu=zgsfu=zg
(: t)fs=zg  : tfs=zg
([]t)fs=zg  []tfs=zg
ht; sifu=zg  ht; fu=zg; sfu=zgi
(t)fu=zg  (tfu=zg)
0(t)fu=zg  0(tfu=zg)
( : t)fu=zg   : tfu=zg
(hit)fu=zg  hi: tfu=zg
(7)
Intuitively, these rules push substitutions under all term constructors but do not include
the rule xfs=xg s, which actually carries out the substitution. Note also that the
rules for explicit substitution distribute substitutions only to variables and allow no
interactions between the substitutions themselves. Hence termination is ensured as the
execution of substitution rules cannot create any redexes that were not present in the
term with all substitutions eliminated. The precise formulation of this idea uses tree-
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orderings to ensure that non-substitution redexes do not create a possibility of an
innite reduction sequences by copying redexes of substitution rules. The following
metatheorems are extended to , as dened by adding the rule (5), the syntax (6)
and the reductions (7) to .
Theorem 8. The -calculus is strongly normalizing.
Proof. Dene the height of a term t inductively by
h(x) = 0
h() = 0
h(C(t)) = h(t) + 1 for any unary term constructor
h(C(t1; t2)) =max(h(t1); h(t2)) + 1:
Now we assign a complexity tree T(t) to each term t. The nodes of the tree are
labelled by a pair of natural numbers. The rst number is (te), where te is the term
t with all explicit substitutions deleted, and the second number indicates the height of
the term t in a subexpression tfu=xg. This tree is inductively dened as follows:
x: T(x) is the tree which consists only of the root with the label (0; 0);
: T() is the tree which consists only of the root with the label (0; 0);
C(t): If the root of T(t) is labelled (n; h), then T(C(t)) is the tree T(t) with the
label of the root changed to ((C(t)e; h);
C(t1; t2): T(C(t1; t2)) is the tree with the root labelled ((C(t1; t2))e; 0) and where the
children of the root are the trees T(t1) and T(t2);
(tfu=xg): The tree T(tfu=xg) is the tree with the root labelled ((te); h(t)) with chil-
dren T(t) and T(u).
We order these trees by the tree-ordering: The tree t1 is smaller than the tree t2 if
any node of t2 can be mapped to a node of t1 such that the root of t2 is greater
than the node of t1 to which it is mapped and that all other nodes of t2 are mapped
to nodes which are not bigger and that a child of a node in t2 is mapped to some
grandchild (including itself) of the image of the parent. The ordering of the nodes is
the lexicographic ordering on natural numbers.
It is well-known that this tree-ordering is a well-ordering, so for the termination
proof it suces to check that whenever t t0, the term t is bigger than t0 in the
tree-ordering. First, consider any non-substitution reduction t t0. If the redex which
is contracted occurs in a substitution term s, say ufs=xg, then only the subtree T(s) is
aected by the reduction t t0, so we can assume without loss of generality that the
redex which is contracted in t is not a substitution term in t. Hence the rst component
of the root T(t) decreases when the redex is contracted. Any substitution term u is
unaected by the reduction t t0. Hence we can use the simple mapping which maps
any nodes which correspond to non-substitution terms to the root and maps the subtree
corresponding to substitution terms u to the same subtree in T(t). Second, consider
316 E. Ritter et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 232 (2000) 299{333
any substitution reduction t t0. In this case the decrease in the tree-ordering results
from the decrease of the second component of the node as the height of the subtree
where the substitution occurs decreases.
Conuence follows from strong normalization and local conuence by Newman’s
Lemma [13], as usual.
Theorem 9. The -calculus is conuent.
Proof. Again, it suces to check local conuence. Because the -calculus is con-
uent it suces to consider only overlaps between explicit substitution rules or an
explicit substitution rule and a rule which does not involve explicit substitution. There
are no critical pairs in the rst case. For the second case, one has to show a sub-
stitution lemma. This lemma states that t[s=x]fu=zg  tfu=zg[sfu=zg=x]. As an ex-
ample for the completion of the critical pairs, consider the redex ((x:A:t)s)fu=zg.
It can reduce to t[s=x]fu=zg, and to (x:A:tfu=zg)sfu=zg). The substitution lemma
now implies that t[s=x]fu=zg  tfu=zg[sfu=zg=x]. This term is also the contractum of
(x:A:tfu=zg)sfu=zg) via -reduction.
3. Representation of sequent derivations in "
In this section, we describe the use of the -calculus to represent sequent proofs.
The classical nature of -calculus inuences the way in which it can be used to
represent intuitionistic sequent derivations. Hence we begin with some observations
about the relationship between intuitionistic and classical sequent derivations.
In general, every intuitionistic derivation arises as a subderivation of a classical
derivation. Because the R-rule allows multiple succedents in the premiss, two dier-
ent intuitionistic sequent derivations, which are not identical up to a permutation of
inference rules, can be subderivations of the same classical sequent derivation up to a
choice of axioms. For example, consider the two intuitionistic derivations 1
B; A!BAx
B!AB; CBR
and
B; C!BAx
B!C B; ABR:
1 These two inferences can either be considered to be instances of R in our multiple-conclusioned
intuitionistic sequent calculus given in Fig. 1 (cf. [34]) or combinations of explicit weakenings and R
instances in Dummett’s system [2].
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They arise as restrictions to intuitionistic logic from the following classical derivation:
B; A; C!B; BAx
B; C!AB; B R
B!AB; CB R:
In this case, both derivations are proofs even in intuitionistic logic, and hence the order
in which the R-rules are executed does not matter. In general, however, this order
matters [34]. As an easy example, take the sequent B!AB;DE. If the formula
AB is reduced rst working from root to leaves then the search succeeds, otherwise
it fails. However, in classical logic the order does not matter. So it becomes apparent
already that the search in the classical sequent calculus, when viewed as a search for
intuitionistic proofs, proceeds in parallel: one classical sequent derivation may have
many intuitionistic subderivations which are not permutations of each other.
The classical _R-rule gives rise to another instance of parallelism. The reason is that
in the classical rule both disjuncts are side formulae, whereas the single-conclusioned
intuitionistic _R-rule keeps only one of the disjuncts. So a classical derivation may
contain two completely dierent intuitionistic subderivations. An example () is
A; C; B; D!A; C Ax
A; C; B!A;DC R
A; C!BA;DC R
A; C! (BA) _ (DC) _R
This derivation contains two intuitionistic subderivations, one for the sequent A; C!B
A and the other for the sequent A; C!DC. These two derivations are obtained
by applying the two possible versions of the single-conclusioned intuitionistic _R-rule
to the sequent A; C! (BA) _ (DC).
Although inferences in classical logic can be freely permuted [12], the property of a
classical sequent derivation having an intuitionistic subderivation is not always invariant
under permutation. Examples of this phenomenon are a bit more complicated. Consider
the sequent
x:AB; y: (AB)B!B ;
where we have attached variables to the antecedents to make it easier to refer to a
specic formula. If rst x is reduced and then y, there is no way of identifying an
intuitionistic subderivation. However, if we reduce rst y, and then x, then we obtain
an intuitionistic derivation. Both derivations are shown in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
Below, we show how to formulate a condition on classical derivations to determine
when they have intuitionistic subderivations. This is formulated as a condition on a
-term that interprets the classical derivation (see Denition 13). Subsequently, we
show how transformations on the -terms can be used to characterize the search
space over a given endsequent (see Theorem 20). We prove the completeness of a
particular search strategy for classical logic with respect to intuitionistic provability.
Again, the formulation of this strategy uses -terms (see Theorem 25).
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Ax
A!A; B; B
R Ax
!A; AB; B B!A; B
L Ax
y: (AB)B!A; B y : (AB)B; B!B
L
x : AB; y : (AB)B!B
Fig. 2. Example derivation before permutation.
Ax Ax
A!A; B; B A; B!B; B
L
x : AB; A ! B; B
R Ax
x : AB ! B; B AB; B ! B
L
x : AB; y : (AB)B ! B
Fig. 3. Example derivation after permutation.
3.1. Translation into 
We start by giving the translation from classical sequent derivations into the -
calculus. Note that the classical sequent derivations have to be suitably annotated for the
denition. Firstly, each sequent has one principal formula in the succedent together with
an arbitrary number of additional formulae. We introduce a name for each additional
formula in the succedent and a variable for each formula in the antecedent. Secondly,
the translation has to take the explicit exchange rule in the -calculus into account.
For example, the axiom  ; x:A!A; B can be translated to the variable x; the axiom
 ; x:A!B; A, however, must be translated to the -term :[]x.
We shall use the following notation: if  is a derivation whose last rule is R applied
to the derivations 1; : : : ; n, we write (1; : : : ; n);R for .
Denition 10. Let  : !A;  be a classical sequent derivation and suppose that each
occurrence of a formula in   and  has a label; i.e., we have  = x1:A1; : : : ; xn:An and
=B11 ; : : : ; B
m
m . (These labels turn into variables and names in the -calculus; hence
we also use them for the derivations.) We dene a -term  satisfying   ` <=:A; 
by induction over the structure of  as follows (note the clause for the exchange rule):
Axiom: Suppose  :  ; x:A!A;  is an axiom, then <= def= x;
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Exchange: Suppose : !A; B; , and
0=; exc: !B; A; :
We dene <0= to be the normal form of the term :[]<= with respect
to the rules  and ;
^L: Suppose we have the derivation
: ; x:A; y:B!A; 
;^L: ; z:A ^ B!A; ^L;
then the corresponding -term is
<;^L= def= <=[(z)=x; 0(z)=y];
^R: Suppose we have the derivation
: !A;   : !B; 
(;  );^R: !A ^ B;  ^R;
then we dene
<(;  );^R= def= h<=; < =i;
L: Suppose we have the derivation
: !A; C;   : ; w:B!C; 
(;  );L: ; x:AB!C;  L
then we dene <(;  );L= to be the normal form of :[]< =fx<==wg with
respect to the reduction rules  and ;
R: Suppose we have the derivation
: ; x:A!B; 
;R: !AB; R;
then we dene <;R= to be x:A:<=;
:L: Suppose we have the derivation
: !A; C; 
;:L: ; x::A!C; L
then we dene <;:L= to be :[?]wfx<==wg;
:R: Suppose we have the derivation
: ; x:A!B; 
;:R: !:A; B; R;
then we dene <;:R= to be the normal form of x:A:?:[]<= via the reduction
rules  and ?;
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_L: Suppose we have the derivation
: ; x:A!  : ; y:B!
(;  );_L: ; z:A _ B! _L
we dene <(;  );_L= to be the normal form of :[]< =f:[]<=fhiz=yg=xg
with respect to the reduction rules  and ;
_R: Assume we have a derivation
: !A; B; 
;_R: !A _ B; 
then we dene <;_R== :<=.
The labelling of the assumptions has one important consequence, namely that there
are several possible translations for the same classical sequent derivation. As an exam-
ple, take the sequent derivation
B; C; A!B; BAx
B; A!C B; B R
B!AB; CB R:
There are two possible -terms corresponding to this derivation, namely
x:A::[]y:C::[]b
and
x:A::[]y:C:b;
where we use the name b to denote the variable corresponding to the formula B
on the left-hand side. (We will often use the lower-case version of the name of a
formula as the name of the corresponding variable.) The rst proof-term uses the
second occurrence of B at the leaf for the axiom, whereas the second uses the rst
occurrence of B in the succedent. In this case the dierence does not matter | both
derivations contain intuitionistic subderivations | but this is not generally true.
3.2. Intuitionistic provability
We consider a sequent calculus presentation of intuitionistic logic with multiple
formulae on the right with weakening built into the inference rules, as in [34]. The
rules are given in Fig. 1. They are a restriction of the classical sequent calculus in
which R and :R are permitted only for, respectively, singleton and empty succedents.
In deciding when a classically derivation indicates that its endsequent is intuition-
istically provable, the requirement is to detect superuous inferences. Consider again
the sequent B!AB;DE. This sequent has an intuitionistic proof in which AB
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is reduced rst. There is also the following classical proof of this sequent:
B; A; D!B; E Ax
B; A!B;DE R
B!AB;DE R :
We want to be able to detect that the use of the R-rule to reduce the formula
DE is superuous by using the -term corresponding to this proof. We can then
conclude that there is an intuitionistic proof of this sequent. The -term representing
this derivation is
x:A::[]y:D::[]b;
and the detection amounts to determining when a subterm (here the -abstraction over
D) models weakening on the right. This example motivates the following denition:
Denition 11. We dene weakening terms and weakening occurrences of names by
induction over the structure of terms as follows:
(i) : t is a weakening term if all occurrences of  in t are weakening occurrences;
(ii) A term t of type ? is always a weakening term;
(iii) ht; si is a weakening term if t and s are weakening terms;
(iv) x:A:t is a weakening term if t is a weakening term and if x has only weakening
occurrences in t;
(v) The outermost occurrence of  in []t and hit is a weakening occurrence if t
is a weakening term;
(vi)  : t is a weakening term if t is a weakening term and all occurrences of  are
weakening occurrences;
(vii) All occurrences of ? in t are weakening occurrences;
(viii) The occurrence of the variable x in tx is a weakening occurrence if t is a
weakening term and x is not free in t. In this case, the term tx is a weakening
term as well;
(ix) tfu=xg is a weakening term if t is a weakening term.
As an example, consider the term
x:A::[]y:D::[]b;
which we considered before this denition. The term y:D::[]b is a weakening
term, and the only occurrence of  is a weakening occurrence. The occurrence of  is
not a weakening occurrence.
Lemma 12. Let t be a term of type   ` t:A; B; . If  has only weakening occur-
rences in t; then every term s such that :[]t   s is a weakening term.
Proof. It is obvious that :[]t is a weakening term. Show by considering each re-
duction rule that rstly reductions of t to t0 only delete occurrences of  or insert
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new weakening occurrences of  but never create non-weakening instances of a name,
secondly, that any contractum of a weakening term is a weakening term and thirdly
that reduction of a term which contains only weakening occurrences of x yields a term
with only weakening occurrences of x. We just present a few cases here. If the term is
: t, then either : t  : t0 with t  t0, and then  has only weakening occurrences
by the rst statement. If the reduction was x:(: t)x  x:A:: t[[]ux=[]u], then
the only occurrences of x and  are weakening occurrences by the rst two statements,
and hence t0 is a weakening term. The case ht; si follows from the second statement,
the case x:A:t from the second and third, and the case  : t follows from the rst
and second statement.
Now we can dene our rst criterion for when a classical sequent derivation deter-
mines the existence of an intuitionistic one.
Denition 13. Call a -term intuitionistic if in any subterm x:A:t which is not a
weakening term, all occurrences of free names are weakening occurrences.
Let us reconsider the examples at the beginning of this section. There are two -
terms corresponding to the two derivations of B!AB; DE. The rst one, which
corresponds to reducing AB rst, is the term
x:A::[]y:D::[]b;
and the second one, which corresponds to reducing DE rst, is the term
y:D::[]x:A:b:
In both cases we have an intuitionistic -term because the -abstraction over D is
a weakening term. This example shows the parallelism obtained by using a classical
sequent calculus: both intuitionistic subderivations of either of the classical proofs are
considered simultaneously without any need for backtracking.
In the same way, there are two -term for the classical proof of the sequent
A; C! (BA) _ (DC), given as example in () Section 3. The rst one, namely
:x: B: :[]y:D::[]a, corresponds to the axiom A!A and the second one,
namely :x:B: :[]y:D:c, corresponds to the axiom C!C. Both terms are in-
tuitionistic and incorporate the two single-conclusioned subderivations simultaneously
without the need for backtracking.
As an example of a non-intuitionistic term, consider the formula :A_A. The classical
proof is
A ! A Ax
! :A; A :R
! :A _ A _R
and the corresponding -term is  :x:A:?:[]x. This term is not intuitionistic
because the name  and the variable x have a non-weakening occurrence in the
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-abstraction. For another example of a non-intuitionistic term, consider Peirce’s for-
mula, ((AB)A)A. The classical proof of this formula is
A!B; A Ax
!AB; A R A!A Ax
(AB)A!A L
! ((AB)A)A R:
If this proof is translated into the -calculus, the term obtained is
x: (AB)A: :[]afx(y:A::[]y)=ag:
The name  has a non-weakening occurrence in the -abstraction over A; hence this
term is not intuitionistic.
Next, we show the correctness of the criterion. The crucial point is that a weaken-
ing term corresponds to a superuous subderivation. The following lemma makes this
precise.
Lemma 14. Let  be a derivation : ; A1; : : : ; An!A; B1; : : : ; Bm;  such that
 ; a1:A1; : : : ; an:An ` <=:A; B11 ; : : : ; Bmm ; 
holds. If the variables ai and names j have only weakening occurrences in <=; then
there is a procedure to construct a sequent derivation of  !A; . Moreover; if <= is
a weakening term; then there is a procedure to construct a derivation of  !. These
procedures transform sequent derivations which have an intuitionistic subderivation;
as described in Fig. 1; into those with the same property.
Proof. By induction over the structure of sequent derivations. We give the case of a
L-rule to illustrate the argument. Suppose we are given a proof ending with
 !C; A;   ;D!A; 
 ; x:C D!A;  L
and suppose that its -term is :[]tfxs=wg. The only interesting case arises if this
term is a weakening term. In this case, the name  has only weakening occurrences in t
and in s, and t is a weakening term. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain derivations
of  !C;  and  ;D! and hence also a derivation of  ; CD!.
Now we are in a position to show the correctness of the criterion.
Theorem 15. Let : !A;  be a classical sequent derivation. If <= is an intuition-
istic -term; then there exists an intuitionistic derivation of  !A; .
Proof. We proceed by induction over the structure of derivations of sequents.
Suppose the last rule is the rule R to obtain a sequent  !AB; . By the
induction hypothesis, we have an intuitionistic sequent derivation of  ; A!B; . Let
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<= = a:A:t. Either <= is a weakening term, in which case Lemma 14 implies that
there is also an intuitionistic derivation of  !, and hence also of  !AB; . If
<= is not a weakening term, then there are no free names in <= that have a non-
weakening occurrence. Hence by Lemma 14 again, there is an intuitionistic derivation
 ; A!B. Now the intuitionistic R-rule yields the result.
Finally, we show the other direction: each intuitionistic sequent derivation  !
gives rise to an intuitionistic -term   ` t:A; 0, where  is a permutation of A; 0.
To show this, we use the standard inclusion of the multiple-conclusioned LJ-calculus
into the LK-calculus: for each R-rule
: ; x:A!B
 !AB; 
in a multiple-conclusioned LJ-derivation add  to all sequents in the LK-derivation
corresponding to  and now use the R-rule of LK. The same procedure is followed
for the :R-rule.
Theorem 16. Let : ! be a multiple-conclusioned LJ-sequent derivation. Then
the term < = of the corresponding LK-derivation  is an intuitionistic -term.
Proof. Show by induction over the structure of  that < = satises the typing judgement
  ` < =:A; 0, where A; 0 is a permutation of  and that < = is intuitionistic. The only
interesting cases are the R-rule and :R-rule. In the rst case, the derivation is
0: ; x:A!B
 !AB;  R
Let  0 be the corresponding LK-derivation. By induction hypothesis, we have  ; x:A`
< 0=:B, and  0 is intuitionistic and contains no free name. We also have also   `
< 0=:B; , and hence the term   ` x:A:<0=:AB;  is an intuitionistic -term. The
case of the :R-rule is similar.
3.3. Representation of uniform proofs
In this subsection and the next, we show that a certain classical proof procedure is
sound and complete for intuitionistic provability of sequents of propositional hereditary
Harrop formulae. The proof procedure is based on an extension of the Miller et al.
[16] notion of uniform proof to multiple-conclusioned systems (see also [15]).
A uniform proof [16] is a sequent derivation in which, when read from root to leaves,
all right rules are applied whenever it is possible so to do, except for axioms with non-
atomic principal formulae. 2 We call a proof fully uniform if right rules are preferred
even over axioms. The notion of a uniform proof leads to a simple, highly deterministic
search algorithm: rst apply all possible right-rules; then select an appropriate left-rule.
2 An axiom is said to be atomic just in case its principal formula is atomic.
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Note that Miller et al. dene uniform proofs for the full, single-conclusioned calculus
LJ [6]. In this case, not every LJ-provable propositional sequent has a uniform proof.
The reason is that it may be necessary to apply the _L-rule before the _R-rule to obtain
a proof. As an example in the multiple-conclusioned calculus consider the sequent
A _ B!C A; B:
The only intuitionistic proof of this sequent reduces the formula A_B rst. If C A is
reduced rst in multiple-conclusioned LJ, we obtain the (intuitionistically unprovable)
sequent C; A_B!A. From now on we restrict ourselves to hereditary Harrop formulae.
The denition of propositional hereditary Harrop formulae (cf. [16, 25]) is as follows:
Denition 17. Dene goal formulae G and denite formulae D by
G ::= A j G ^ G j DG j G _ G
D ::= A j GA j D ^ D;
where A is atomic. Call a sequent  ! hereditary Harrop if   consists of just
D-formulae and  consists of just G-formulae.
It is not the case that each uniform proof in the sense of [16] is a uniform proof
in the above sense. The reason is the _R-rule: in the single-conclusioned calculus, the
antecedent throws away one of the disjuncts, whereas both are kept in the multiple-
conclusioned calculus. Hence we must expand both formulae in a uniform proof as
dened for the multiple-conclusioned calculus. As an example, consider the derivation
of the sequent A; C! (BA)_(DC), given in Section 3. This derivation is uniform
in our sense, and the uniform proof in the single-conclusioned calculus LJ is
A; C; B!A Ax
A; C!BA R
A; C! (BA) _ (DC) _R
The uniform derivation in the multiple-conclusioned calculus cannot be obtained by
simply adding the formula DC to all right-hand sides and then applying the multiple-
conclusioned _R-rule instead.
We make the relation between the two notions of uniform proof precise at the end
of the next subsection, after we have studied the eect of permutations on classical
uniform proofs.
3.4. Permutations
The analysis of permutations in proofs is important because there are (well-known)
non-permutabilities in intuitionistic logic. We have seen examples of this already,
namely with the sequents B!AB; DE and (AB)B; AB!B. The rst
case covers the exchange of two right-rules. There, the order in which the two right-
rules were executed did not matter. The second case concerns the exchange of L-rules.
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Whereas in the rst case there is a general strategy which renders an exhaustive search
of all permutation variants superuous, in the second case we do have to take into
account all possible permutations of L-rules for completeness. The invariance under
right-rules is covered by the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Let  be a classical sequent derivation such that <= is an intuitionistic
-term.
(i) If  is the derivation resulting from interchanging any two right-rules apart from
an R-rule and an ^R-rule in  then < = is an intuitionistic term.
(ii) If  is the derivation
 ; A!B; C;   ; A!B;D; 
 ; A!B; C ^ D; ^R
 !AB; C ^ D; R;
then the derivation  obtained by permuting the R-rule over the ^R-rule; to-
wards the leaves; has an intuitionistic -term < =. Conversely; if we start with
a  such that < = is an intuitionistic -term; and permute the rules other way
around; then at least one of the -terms that results from a dierent choice
of axioms in the permuted derivation is intuitionistic.
Proof. (i) We show the permutation of a R-rule over a _R-rule as an example. The
other cases are similar. So assume we are given a derivation 
...
 ; C!A; B; D
 ; C!A _ B;D _R
 !A _ B; CD R
with <= = :[]z:C::[]: t. There are two cases, depending whether <= is a
weakening term or not. We consider only the rst case here. In this case the variable
z has only weakening occurrences in t, and the name  has only weakening occur-
rences in t. These conditions are enough to ensure that the -term of the permuted
derivation  ,
...
 ; C!A; B; D
 !A; B; CD R
 !A _ B; CD _R;
which is < = = : :[]z:C::[]t is an intuitionistic -term.
(ii) The statement about permuting the R-rule towards the leaves is shown in the
same way as in (i). The additional statement arises from the fact that if the term
x:A::[]t is not a weakening term, then in []t the name  has only weakening oc-
currences. Now we use Lemma 14 to show that in this case  ; A!B has a intuitionistic
sequent proof. The derivation is now obvious.
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There are cases in which moving an R-rule below a ^R-rule can lead to a deriva-
tion which has no intuitionistic -term assigned to it. As an example, consider the
(permuted) derivation
B;D; A!B; C Ax B; D; A!B;D Ax
B;D; A!B; C ^ D ^R
B;D!AB; C ^ D R
If we choose the axiom with principal formula D to close the second leaf sequent, the
resulting -term is not intuitionistic. However, with the other choice, namely the
axiom with principal formula B, we do obtain an intuitionistic proof.
The key point for the completeness proof below is that the restriction to hereditary
Harrop formulae implies that we can prove a stronger version of the disjunction prop-
erty. In general, we have only that if a formula A _ B is intuitionistically provable,
then at least one of A and B is intuitionistically provable. Here we can strengthen this
property to hold also if there are additional hypotheses under which A_B is provable.
When we consider a multi-conclusioned LJ, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Let the sequent  ! be intuitionistically provable and hereditary
Harrop. Then there exists a formula A2 such that  !A is intuitionistically prov-
able too. Moreover; there exists a sequent derivation  : !A;  such that <= has
no free names and that in all applications of the L-rule where the principal formula
is GB the right branch is the axiom  ; B!B.
Proof. By assumption, there exists a normal -term t with   ` t:A1 _    _ An if  =
A1; : : : ; An. Because the formulae in   and  are hereditary Harrop formulae, the term
t is derivable by the grammar
t ::= inl(t) j inr(t) j x:A:t j 1(  m(x)   )t1 : : : tn j ht; ti
where 1; : : : ; m is any combination of  and 0. Note that in case m; n = 0, the
fourth clause reduces to a variable. Now construct by induction over the structure of t
a sequent derivation :  !A;  such that <= has no free names and such that in all
applications of the L-rule the right branch is the axiom  ; A!A where GA is the
principal formula of the L-rule. We just consider the case of a term   ` inl(t):A_B.
By induction hypothesis we have a sequent derivation  ending in  !A with all the
desired properties. Now consider the derivation 0 which is  with B added to the
right-hand side of all sequents. We have <= = <0=, and 0 has all desired properties
as well. It is now easy to see that the derivation 0;_R with <0;_R= = :<= has all
desired properties.
Now we are in a position to deduce completeness.
Theorem 20. If the hereditary Harrop sequent  !A;  is intuitionistically provable;
then; for any possible order of right-rules applied to the succedent; there exists a
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fully uniform (classical) proof  of the sequent with this order of right rules such
that < = is intuitionistic.
Proof. The sequent  !A;  is intuitionistically provable; so, by Lemma 19, there
exists a formula B in A;  such that  is a fully uniform LJ-proof of  !B in which
each leaf of  is atomic. Moreover, <= has no free names. Now show by a double
induction over the derivation  and the structure of formulae on the right-hand side of
 that for any such derivation  and any antecedent  0 and succedent 0, any order
of right rules applied to B; 0, there is a fully uniform proof  :  ;  0!B; 0, with the
order of the right rules such that the following three conditions are met:
(i) < = is intuitionistic;
(ii)  has only weakening occurrences of free names except possibly a name for the
formula B, and all subterms corresponding to right rules reducing formulas in 0
are weakening terms;
(iii) the variables occurring in  0 do not occur in < =.
We consider here only the case of the last rule in  being a R-rule, and the case
of the formula BC 20. In the rst case assume =0;R and AB being the
principal formula of the R-rule. Then by induction hypothesis there exists a derivation
 0 : ; x :A;  0; !B; ; 0 where in < 0= all free names and all free variables in  0 have
only weakening occurrences. Hence the derivation  0;R :  ;  0!AB;  satises
the desired properties. Now we turn to the case of BC 20. Here, by induction
hypothesis there exists a derivation  0 :  ;  0; x : B!A; C; ; 0 such that x and 
have only weakening occurrences in < 0=. So the derivation  0;R with < 0;R==
x : B:: []< 0= has the desired properties.
The proof is concluded by setting 0=00, where 00 is obtained from  by possible
exchange of A and B.
Note that the proof of the theorem also shows the way in which the multiple-
conclusioned notion of uniform classical proof generalizes the corresponding notion for
single-conclusions: each uniform proof in the single-conclusioned sense corresponds to
a normal -term, and the above proof shows how to construct a multiple-conclusioned
uniform proof from this -term which contains the original proof as a subproof. As
an example, take the sequent A; C! (BA) _ (DC). One uniform derivation in
the single-conclusioned calculus LJ was given in Section 3.4. The construction in
the above proof yields exactly the multiple-conclusioned uniform derivation given in
Section 3.
4. Application to (hereditary Harrop) analytic resolution
In this section, we apply the above results to an analytic resolution procedure for
intuitionistically provable hereditary Harrop formulae based on the L rule. The key
point is that in an application of a L-rule to the formula BA, the formula A is
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always atomic, and hence can be matched with a formula in the succedent. We will
show that there is no loss of generality in this restriction which facilitates the search
procedure signicantly.
Denition 21. A sequent derivation is called a resolution derivation if it satises the
following constraints for rule applications:
(i) An ^R-rule is applied only if no formula on the right-hand side is a disjunction;
(ii) An R-rule is applied only if no formula on the right-hand side is a conjunction
or a disjunction;
(iii) An L-rule, with principal formula GA, is applied only if all formulae on the
right-hand side are atomic and A occurs on the right-hand side;
(iv) A ^L-rule is applied only if all formulae on the right-hand side are atomic;
(v) An _L-rule is applied only if no formula on the left-hand side is a conjunction.
We include condition (iv) only for consistency with the usual denition [16, 25]. It
is inessential for the analysis presented here.
The primary dierence between a fully uniform proof and a resolution proof is the
requirement in the latter that the atomic matrix of the principal formula of each L
rule match with an atom on the succedent of the conclusion of the rule. Note also
that the application of both the left and right rules has to be in a specied order |
conjunction rst | in the case of the latter.
Lemma 18 implies that if the restricted order in which the right rules are applied does
not succeed in obtaining an intuitionistic proof, then no other ordering will. Moreover,
resolution proofs are complete for intuitionistic provability of propositional hereditary
Harrop formulae.
Corollary 22. If  ! is an intuitionistically provable hereditary Harrop sequent;
then there exists a resolution proof  of this sequent such that < = is intuitionistic.
Proof. The derivation constructed in Theorem 20 is in fact not only a uniform proof
but also a resolution proof.
So, in order to search for an intuitionistic proof of the sequent  ! it is enough
to construct a resolution proof and then check, for all possible axiom instances and all
possible exchanges of L-rules, whether the corresponding -terms are intuitionistic.
Working on the -terms, the rst step consists in replacing a variable x by : []y
or vice versa. The second step is a lot more complicated to capture. The reason is that
the L-rules introduce arbitrarily complex formulae in the succedent: these formulae
must be decomposed.
To see the necessity of exchanging L-rules, consider the sequent
x : AB; y : (AB)B!B :
One possible derivation is given by Fig. 2, in which x is reduced rst. The deriva-
tion in Fig. 3 is obtained from the rst one by exchanging the two occurrences
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of the L-rule, i.e., exchanging the order of reduction of x and y, and then push-
ing the right-rules to the root of the derivation, thereby obtaining a uniform deriva-
tion. The corresponding -terms are : []bfx(: []bfy(a:A: : []a)=bg)=bg
and bfy(a:A:bfxa=bg)=bg. The rst is not an intuitionistic -term because the
-abstraction over A is not a weakening term, and yet the occurrence of [] is not a
weakening occurrence. The second one is an intuitionistic -term because there are
no names (in fact, it is the uniform derivation in the single-conclusioned calculus LJ).
Note that both derivations are not only uniform but are also resolution derivations.
This implies that the second premiss in the L-rule is always an axiom. However both
premisses of the L rule are important for determining when a resolution derivation is
intuitionistic. The reason is that the choice of the axiom at the right premiss matters.
This is not the case for single-conclusioned intuitionistic resolutions.
A description of the eects of exchanging two L-rules requires an operational
characterization of the normal form of a -term, which is given in the following
denition.
Denition 23. Let t be any -term such that   ` t:A; . A uniform term CA(t1; : : : ;
tn) for t is a -term with parameters (holes) t1; : : : ; tn dened by induction over the
structure of A as follows:
(i) If A is a base type, then CA(t)= s, where s is the normal form of t;
(ii) For a function type AB, dene CA B(t1; : : : ; tn) to be x:A:CB(t1; : : : ; tn),
where CB(t1; : : : ; tn) is the uniform term for tx;
(iii) For a product type A ^ B, dene CA^B(t1; : : : ; tn; s1; : : : ; sm) to be
hCA(t1; : : : ; tn); CB(s1; : : : ; sm)i;
where CA(t1; : : : ; tn) and CB(s1; : : : ; sm) are the uniform terms for 1(t) and 2(t),
respectively;
(iv) For a sum type A _ B, dene CA_B(t1; : : : ; tn) to be  :CA(t1; : : : ; tn), where
CA(t1; : : : ; tn) is the uniform term for hit.
Next we show that the construction of a uniform term corresponds to normalization.
Lemma 24. Let  be the sequent derivation
 ;  i;
i! Ai; B; 
 R
 ; b : B!A; B; 
where all formulae Ai and in  are atoms. Then <==CA(<i=); and if all terms
<i= are in normal form; <= is a normal form as well. Moreover; if i is the proof
 ; b : B b! Ai; B; ; then <= is the normal form of : []b.
Proof. Induction over the structure of A.
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 ;  i;  i; j !Cj; Ai; B; D; 
...R
 ;  i !C; Ai; B; D;   ;  i; v : D!Ai; B; D; 
L
 ;  i; y : C D!Ai; B; D; 
...R
 ; y : C D!A; B; D;   ; y : C D;w : B!B;D; 
L
 ; x : AB; y : C D!B;D; 
Fig. 4. Derivation before permutation.
 ;  j;  i; j !Ai; Cj; B; D; 
...R
 ;  j !A; Cj; B; D;   ;  j; w : B!Cj; B; D; 
L
 ;  j; x : AB!Cj; B; D; 
...R
 ; x : AB!C; B; D;   ; x : AB; y : D!B;D; 
L
 ; x : AB; y : C D!B;D; 
Fig. 5. Derivation after permutation.
Now we describe the exchange in detail. Consider Figs. 4 and 5. The former is
intended to be a classically valid uniform derivation. The latter is intended to be an
intuitionistically valid uniform derivation obtained from the former by permuting L
rules with respect to one another and by inserting any right-rules so induced.
Theorem 25. Let  be the uniform derivation given in Fig. 4 and let
wfx(CA(sifyCC(ui; j)=vg))=wg
be the corresponding -term where CA(si) is the normal form of : []v. Then
the -term corresponding to the exchanged derivation; given in Fig. 5, is the term
vfy(CC(tjfxCA(u0i; j)=wg))=vg;
where CA(u0i; j) is the uniform term corresponding to i : []ui; j and C
C(tj) is the
normal form of : []w. If the rst derivation is a resolution derivation; so is the
second one.
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Proof. Easy consequence of Lemma 24.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a characterization of provability in propositional intuitionistic
logic in terms of the -calculus | a variant of Parigot’s -calculus. This calculus
provides a system of realizers for the (cut-free) classical sequent calculus. Moreover,
we have formulated a condition on the realizers for when a classical derivation yields
sucient evidence to judge the provability of the endsequent in intuitionistic logic.
The characterization allows us to obtain search procedures for intuitionistic logic
from search procedures for classical logic. We have exploited this by showing how an
analytic resolution procedure for intuitionistically provable hereditary Harrop formulae
can be obtained from a proof procedure constructing classical multiple-conclusioned
uniform proofs. The combinatorics of the classical calculus can then be used to compute
realizers on which the test for intuitionistic provability can be performed.
One direction for further work is add quantiers, where we encounter a variety of
familiar issues (cf. [34, 26]) connected with the calculation of witnesses via unication.
For example, we must identify suitable global correctness criteria that do not require
signicant backtracking [26, 30, 34].
A second direction concerns applications. One promising line is to analyse the
intuitionistic force of standard classical proof procedures such as various resolution
methods, model elimination and tableaux methods, by representing these procedures as
methods for constructing classical proof-objects (i.e., -terms). The case of resolu-
tion has been explored in [29, 3].
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